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1. Introduction  
In everyday language, complicity means taking part, in one way or the other, in a crime or 
wrongdoing done by another person. In general, the role of the accomplice is not strictly of 
the same quality as that of the main actor or, in legal terminology, of the principal. As a rule 
it is judged to of minor gravity. Nevertheless, if the offense is grave enough, the accomplice 
may be found guilty, in law, as an accessory to the crime, or, in general morality, become the 
object of moral reproach as standing in a relation to the wrongdoer analogous to that of 
accessory and principal.  
During the last decades, bioethical discussion has considerably extended the scope of the 
concept of complicity. Quite a number of further semantic facets were added to its standard 
meaning, making the concept extremely fruitful for a fine-grained ethical analysis of certain 
moral constellations involving a plurality of agents (cf. Singer 1993, 165 f., Luna, 1997, Friele 
2000). These extensions concern weaker kinds of collaboration or collusion with a morally 
wrong act than the legal concept, in particular practices of making use of the results or 
products of a morally wrong or morally problematic activity. This kind of "eating fruit from 
a forbidden tree" is not usually subjected to the same moral criticism as the wrong act itself 
(henceforth "W"). But "complicity" continues to imply some kind of moral offensiveness. The 
concept keeps its negative connotation, though the degree to which the wrong of the 
"accomplice" (henceforth "C") is held be condemnable is usually significantly lower than that 
of the act to which it is accessory. Though the act of the "accomplice" is much less grave than 
the original act, it nevertheless leaves a "moral stain", however weak, on the accomplice.  
2. Five types of complicity 
Before discussing how complicity is exemplified, under certain premises, by embryonic 
stem cell research, let us first pass in review the most important of the possible relations that 
can obtain between W, the wrongdoer, and the "accomplice" C, in the standard and in the 
extended sense. As far as I see, five types of complicity can be distinguished (Table 1).  
Whereas the first variant constitutes the most clear-cut and indeed "classical" case of 
complicity, complicity in the other variants is more indirect. In variant 2, complicity consists 
in achieving the goals of an act W that is itself blameworthy but that would not achieve its 
end without the collaboration of some other agent. C as it were brings the process to the end 
it was intended for from the start. Whoever knowingly sells stolen goods is not a thief. 
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However, he completes, as it were, the act of stealing and realizes the end for which, as a 
rule, the original act was undertaken. The same holds for the seller and the buyer of goods 
produced under morally problematic conditions, such as children's labour, or, from the 
perspective of the ethical vegetarian, for sellers and buyers of meat from animals. In these 
cases, although the fact that there are "accomplices" who realize the purposes for which W is 
undertaken is not necessary for W, which would constitute an offense in its own right, C is 
necessary for W to have a point. Furthermore, the "accomplice" is necessary if W is to 
become a practice and to establish an expectation on the side of the doer of W that he will be 
able to profit from what he does. In many cases, a general abandonment of C would stop the 
practice of W. Without the seller of stolen goods, stealing would lose much of its attraction, 
as would slaughtering animals without meat-eating customers.  
 
 Act constituting complicity Complicity relation  
1 C actively participates in carrying out W Direct active participation 
2 C achieves the end for which W was carried out  Completion of W  
3 C contributes to W becoming a practice by encouraging 
others, including the original agent, to carry out W 
Imitation effect  
4 C encourages others to become less critical of W (and, 
possibly, to co-operate with W-doers)  
Re-evaluation effect 
5 C is, or is seen as, incongruent with the moral rejection of W Expressive dissonance 
Table 1. Types of complicity 
In variant 3, complicity lies in the effect C has on the tendency of others to imitate W, either 
in its own right or because of what can be gained from its direct or indirect effects. By 
making use of W for positively valued aims, C may encourage others to risk W despite its 
moral offensiveness, especially if W is the only or the only available means to achieve these 
aims. Even if W lies in the past, making use of its results has, as a rule, a certain probability 
to encourage similar acts in the future, where the probability of this happening depends on 
several factors, among them the publicity of C and the reputation of the agent. A convinced 
vegetarian with a certain influence on his social environment thereby has an additional 
reason to abstain from buying meat at the supermarket. Indeed, professed vegetarians like 
Albert Schweitzer have been rightly criticized by ideologists of vegetarianism for not being 
consistent in their behaviour given their role as moral models. By breaking the rules they are 
perceived to stand for they invite imitation and tend to weaken the moral judgements 
underlying the rejection of W. 
In variant 4, this weakening takes a different turn. The role of complicity consists in inviting 
not an imitation but a re-evaluation of W given its favourable effects. This type of complicity 
is exemplified by cases in which C is judged to have an influence on the moral evaluation of 
W irrespective of whether C is thought to have a direct or indirect influence on the practice 
of W itself. A relevant example is the use of cells and tissues from aborted embryos. It is 
unlikely that using tissues from aborted embryos has a significant effect on the frequency 
with which abortions are carried out, and most of the commentators on the practice know 
that perfectly well. After all, the international guidelines for the transplantation of 
embryonic neural tissue explicitly demand that the woman's decision to have an abortion be 
independent from her decision to allow using the aborted embryo for research or 
therapeutic purposes. Nor is it reasonable to expect that the part played by gynaecologists in 
abortion is significantly changed by the perspective of using the results of the procedure for 
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purposes such as the experimental treatment of patients in late stages of Parkinson's disease. 
In these cases, then, there is again no direct causal relation between C and W. However, 
putting the results of W to some further use might nevertheless be seen as constituting an 
act of complicity to the extent that the morally laudable aims of using the results of W might 
tend to weaken the moral condemnation of W, and thus lower the psychological threshold 
that now exists for W and similar acts. The reasoning behind this argument is obvious. If W 
is morally wrong, it must be good that it meets with widespread moral disapproval. It must 
be bad if the practice of using its results for morally laudable purposes makes it seem more 
acceptable than it is. 
This kind of reasoning seems to have been the basis of the recommendation of the Central 
Ethics Committee of the Bundesärztekammer, the German Medical Association, in July 1998, 
in which the Committee declared its opposition to the retrieval of fetal brain tissue for 
purposes of neurotransplantation. One of its arguments was that this practice might weaken 
the moral rejection of abortion for non-medical reasons in society at large (Zentrale 
Ethikkommission, 1998). Partly as a consequence of this, neurotransplantation of embryonic 
tissue, which started in the early 1990s in Hanover, came to a halt in Germany (later, its 
problematic success was a further reason not to pursue this line further). However, the 
reasonableness of this step was doubtful from the start, since the sociological hypothesis 
underlying the Committee's statement does not seem plausible. Attitudes to abortion are a 
matter of fundamental moral outlook. It is unlikely that these attitudes will be significantly 
changed by the recognition that some good may come from evil. 
In many ways, variant 5 is the most interesting one. In this case, complicity involves an 
incongruence, as one might call it, between rejecting W and making use of results which 
were made possible by W. In this case, even an indirect causal relation between C and W is 
absent. It need not be assumed, that is, that acts similar to W are encouraged by C or that 
attitudes will be changed in a way that raises the probability of W being carried out. The 
complicity relation in this case consists in a purely internal relation between C and the 
qualification of W as morally objectionable. The conflict is not one between C and its 
consequences but between C and the beliefs held by the person carrying out C. Ronald 
Green has adequately described this case as one of "appearance of endorsing, conferring 
legitimacy on or diluting the condemnation of a wrongful deed" (Green, 2001, 146). There is 
an obvious incongruence, as one might call it, between rejecting W and using results which 
were made possible by W. One important additional variable on which the tendency to 
attribute this last type of complicity depends seems to be the extent to which the person 
carrying out C co-operates with the person carrying out W in using the results or products of 
the latter's wrongdoing. Using the organs of a murder victim for purposes of transplantation 
is not seen as an act of complicity precisely because there is normally no co-operation 
between murderer and transplanting physician. The physician is in no way involved in the 
act that lead to the transplant, nor is there any kind of contact between the physician and the 
murderer. The situation is different if the transplants come from prisoners executed in China 
for political reasons. It is hard to imagine circumstances under which these organs could be 
made available without at least an indirect co-operation between those interested in making 
use of these organs and the authorities responsible for the executions. For the overall moral 
evaluation of complicity, co-operation is at least one crucial factor. The point is that 
transplanting organs from Chinese political prisoners would seem to be incompatible with 
an honest moral disapproval of the death penalty for political prisoners, whereas 
transplanting organs from murder victims seems to be fully compatible with a honest moral 
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disapproval of murder. Although disapproval of W and disapproval of making use of the 
results of W are separate items, they cannot be "isolated" against each other. There remains 
what might be called an expressive dissonance. 
Expressive dissonance is largely a symbolic relation. Complicity in this case is primarily 
something  "in the head" and nothing in the "outer world". This is immediately clear when 
one looks at the controversy, in American bioethics of the 1990ies, about whether results of 
the cruel experiments carried out in German and Japanese concentration camps during the 
Second World War should be used in medical research (cf. the contributions of Freedman, 
Greene, Kor and Segal in Caplan, 1992). The focus of this debate was not the fear that 
making use of these results might function as an incentive to carry out similar experiments 
in the future (in the sense of variant 3) or that psychic thresholds against this kind of 
research might be lowered (in the sense of variant 4), but a purely symbolic relation of 
incongruence between thought and action, valuation and motivation.  
3. Types of complicity involved in ESC research 
Complicity in one or more of the variants distinguished above is the core of the criticism 
levelled against research on pluripotent human embryonic stem cells (hESC) in many 
quarters and has even, in some countries, become the basis of legal prohibitions. It is clear 
that hESC research is not inherently morally problematic, at least not in ways that are 
peculiar to this kind of research. Though there is some amount of misunderstanding in the 
general public on the point, embryonic stem cells are not themselves human embryos and 
therefore should not be subsumed under the umbrella term "embryo research". Whatever is 
morally problematic about this research concerns the sources from which the stem cells are 
derived and the methods by which they are retrieved. Three of these sources and four 
procedures are held to raise moral problems: 
 
 Type of research Source of stem cells Morally problematic procedure 
1 Research on human 
embryonic germ cells 
Aborted embryos  Abortion for non-medical reasons  
2 Research on hESC  Supernumerary 
embryos produced in 
the course of IVF 
Destruction of human embryos due to 
extraction of stem cells 
3   
 
Making the human embryo a "mere" 
means to extraneous ends  
4   Generating supernumerary human 
embryos with the the conditional 
intention of using them as sources of 
stem cells 
5  Supernumerary 
embryos resulting  
from PGD 
Selection of living human embryos 
6 Research on hESC Embryos produced 
specifically for research 
by IVF or stem cell 
nuclear transfer 
Production of human embryos by nuclear 
transfer; destruction of human embryos 
due to extraction of stem cells 
Table 2. Sources and methods of the retrieval of hES cells 
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1. Aborted embryos: In the retrieval of embryonic germ cells, the morally problematic 
point of the procedure is the abortion for non-medical reasons that precedes the 
derivation of germ cells. At least a substantial proportion of the population rejects 
abortion for non-medical reasons. Furthermore, abortion is unlawful in some countries. 
In German law, for example, abortion in the first trimester is not punishable, but 
nevertheless unlawful. On the other hand, no further moral problem seems to arise 
provided that the couple validly consents to the use of the aborted material for research 
or therapeutic purposes. Although using an aborted embryo or parts of it for research 
or therapeutic purposes amounts to using it as a means to an end, this is not generally 
thought to be morally objectionable. The crucial consideration is that the embryo is 
dead and incapable of further development. The therapeutic use to which the 
embryonic tissue is put is commonly held to carry enough moral weight to compensate 
for the lack of piety involved in using the dead embryo as a means to an end. 
2/3. Supernumerary embryos from IVF: The extraction of hESC from supernumerary 
embryos exhibits two morally controversial features: the killing of a living embryo by 
the extraction of the inner cell tissue, and the fact that the embryo is instrumentalized. 
Since the embryo is utilized for purposes neither related to the preservation of its own 
life or health nor to its own development, it is used as a "mere" means to an end in the 
Kantian sense. For this reason, using IVF embryos for the derivation of cells (or, more 
generally, to do research with them) is legally forbidden especially in countries where 
either the principles of the protection of human life is understood to cover the complete 
prenatal period (as Roman Catholicism does) or where the principle of human dignity 
is interpreted as ruling out "instrumentalizing" the human embryo even in its first 
stages of development. In addition, the German Embryo Protection Act enjoins that all 
embryos generated in the course of IVF be transferred to the uterus, thereby precluding 
that supernumerary embryos are generated with the conditional intention of using 
them as sources of stem cells. 
4. Given the availability of stem cell extraction techniques, a further problem might be 
seen to arise from the conditional intention to make use of this technique in the course 
of IVF. This is relevant not only to cases in which supernumerary embryos are 
generated with the explicit purpose of later using them as raw material for stem cell 
research, but also when this possibility is accepted as a potential consequence of 
generating more embryos than are transferred to the woman. 
5. Pre-implantation diagnosis with selective transfer of IVF embryos is often seen as 
morally problematic because it involves the conditional intention to let some living 
embryos perish, i. e. those that prove to be unsuitable for implantation in the course of 
genetic diagnosis. Selection of offspring is, in bioethics as in the general population, 
often rejected out-of-hand, irrespective of context and purpose. There is a widespread 
tendency to associate selection of offspring with "eugenics", which by itself is 
predominantly used with a negative connotation. It is interesting, in this context, to 
contrast selective procedures such as pre-implantation diagnosis (PGD) with germ-line 
intervention. Even if practised for the same purposes, both procedures have a 
completely different gestalt. The gestalt of germ-line intervention is that of doing 
something good to something living, whereas the gestalt of selection is that of a test by 
which the right to life is reserved to whatever meets certain criteria. A similar contrast 
can be drawn with pre-natal diagnosis (PND). Though it might be said that the 
physician's role as a "gatekeeper" to existence is common to PGD and PND, whoever 
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holds a strong principle of human dignity will see an important difference between the 
two methods: the fact that PGD involves a higher degree of selectivity than PGD. In 
both cases a choice is made, but the choices are of different sorts. In PND, there is a 
choice between yes and no, acceptance or non-acceptance, whereas the choice involved 
in PGD is of a "pick-and-mix"-kind, a selection of the best candidates out of a larger 
collective. Therefore, PGD might be seen as "instrumentalizing" embryos to a higher 
degree than PND. It is, therefore, no accident that according to the German Stem Cell 
Law, the permission to import hES cells from countries in which the extraction of hES 
cells from embryos is legal is restricted to embryos produced from IVF without the 
additional employment of selective techniques such as PGD.  
6. Specific-for-research embryos: This procedure is often seen as posing moral problems of 
an even higher gravity than the above two procedures. In this case human embryos are 
not only killed and instrumentalized, but are explicitly generated in order to be 
instrumentalized for research or therapeutic purposes. This further step is widely held 
to constitute an additional and independent moral problem. The intention of generating 
human life solely for purposes other than for development to maturity is, in this case, 
unconditional and unavoidable. Although it cannot be excluded that the same 
unconditional intention may be present in some cases in which supernumerary 
embryos are generated in IVF, there is an objective difference between the procedures. 
While in IVF reproductive purposes are dominant (no matter what further intentions 
come in), reproductive purposes are explicitly ruled out in research cloning. In 
consequence, the production of embryos by nuclear transfer is illegal even in many 
countries in which hES cell derivation is legal.  
It should by now be obvious that hESC research involves the researcher in quite a number of 
complicity relations with the procedures seen as morally problematic by many. The first 
variant of complicity is involved whenever a researcher directly participates in the 
extraction of stem cells from embryos (resulting in their death) or participates in generating 
embryos by nuclear transfer. The first variant of complicity is also exhibited by instigation. 
Instigation is present whenever the researcher makes others carry out these procedures with 
the (unconditional or conditional) intention to use the products or the results of these 
procedures for research, his own or other's. In this case, he is not himself directly causally 
involved in carrying out the procedures, but nonetheless acts as one of the causally 
necessary conditions of their being carried out by others. Instigation implies that – at least in 
the normal course of events – the procedures would not have been undertaken but for the 
intervention of the researcher. A paradigm case is the "ordering" of hES cells for research 
from countries in which retrieval of these cells is legal. 
In contrast to this "strong" variant of complicity, the other, weaker variants of complicity are 
ubiquitous and are characteristic of the relevant research activity even in countries in which 
the extraction of hES cells is illegal. All kinds of hESC research depend on the availability of 
material derived from embryos, and some kind of co-operation, possibly mediated by third 
parties, seems inevitable, with the physicians carrying out the abortion and with other 
physicians or biologists extracting stem cells from blastocysts. Complicity of some kind 
seems unavoidable. However, that the one variant of complicity is illegal in these countries 
whereas the others are not, is in itself an interesting fact and throws light on the compromise 
character of the permission to do this kind of research. On the one hand, one does not want 
to stay behind other countries in this line of research. On the other hand, one wants to pay 
tribute to the moral conviction of those sectors of the population who are strictly against the 
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use of human embryos, however, indirect, in research. There are many forms these 
compromises may take. Mostly they exclude certain kinds of complicity (for example the 
use of hES cells generated by procedures 5 and 6 in the above list) but allow others that are 
seen to be more acceptable (such as sources 1 and 2 in the above list). It is clear, however, 
that all procedures involve one or more variants of (weak) complicity.  
Research on embryonic germ cells (1) presupposes that an abortion has been carried out for 
non-medical reasons. Even if the mother decides on the abortion independently of the 
decision to make the aborted embryo available for research such an abortion is unlawful in 
may legislations (even if not punishable) and is regarded by many people as morally 
problematic if not worse. Though the researcher who makes use of the cells derived from 
the embryo does not actively participate in the abortion he inevitably stands to it in a 
complicity relation that, from the perspective of those with strong moral reservations 
against abortions, confers part of the blame to him as the one who profits from it. Though 
his purposes are quite different from the purposes of the original wrong (and possibly 
morally neutral or even meritorious) he participates in an overall constellation that is 
predominantly morally wrong (cf. Vawter 1991). Furthermore, the more his purposes are 
morally laudable, the more he risks imitation and re-evaluation effects. 
Research on hESC retrieved from supernumerary embryos (2-4) involves complicity at least 
in sense 2 in all cases in which the research is carried out in a country (like, at present, 
Germany or Italy)  in which derivation of hES cells is illegal but in which importing hES 
cells is legal under certain conditions. As a rule, further variants of complicity are involved 
at the same time. Thus, though the German Stem Cell Law rules out that research activities 
in Germany are directly causal for the derivation of hES cells in countries with a more liberal 
legal situation by instituting a "Stichtagsregelung" similar to that established by President 
Bush in the US which provides that imported hES cells must be already available at the 
point of time at which they are "ordered", it cannot prevent that these cells are extracted by 
those who provide them with, among others, an intention to sell them in the future to 
researchers in countries where derivation is illegal. Furthermore, the expectation that the 
"Stichtagsregelung" will be handled in a sufficiently flexible way to allow future imports has 
considerably grown since the German Bundestag decided on extending the "Stich-
tagsregelung" in a way that allows researchers to buy updated cell lines in order to keep 
abreast of new international developments. Thus, though the Law effectively rules out 
complicity of type 1, the active participation of German researchers in the killing of human 
embryos by the extraction of hES cells in the form of instigation, it is unable to rule out 
complicity of type 2. Even in the absence of a direct causal relation between W and C, 
carrying out the research means to achieve the aims for which W was done in the first place.  
Whether complicity of type 3 and 4 are also present in this case, depends on the success, or 
rather the expected success of the experimental use of hES cells. Apart from the growing 
scientific interest of hESC research, especially as a model serving as a measuring rod for the 
potentialities of induced pluripotent human stem cells, therapeutic uses in humans have not 
yet become visible and are increasingly seen with scepticism, not least because of the 
considerable risks of cancerogenity and the risks that transplanted hES cells will be rejected 
by the host organism.  
Analogous considerations apply to the two remaining forms of hESC research, research on 
hESC retrieved from supernumerary embryos by others in the context of PGD (5) or 
produced by nuclear transfer (6). In both cases, complicity comprises additional factors 
whenever not only the extraction of hES cells from embryos is seen as morally wrong but 
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also the methods by which the embryos are produced. The fact that (5) and (6) are explicitly 
ruled out, e. g. by the German Stem Cell Law shows that not only considerations of direct or 
indirect causal role enter into the legal response to these procedures, but also considerations 
of complicity. The legal situation is only adequately understood if, besides the strong form 
of complicity (variant 1), the weaker forms of complicity are  taken into account.  
4. When does complicity amount to a "moral stain"? 
Complicity can amount to a "moral stain", but this is not necessarily so. In general, certain 
further conditions must be fulfilled in order to make complicity with a morally problematic 
act itself a problematic act. Since whether an act is morally problematic is not a yes-or-no-
affair but allows of degrees, the discussion of these factors gives us an opportunity to see on 
what the extent to which an act of complicity seems condemnable depends.  
In the following I will, for reasons of simplification, make two presuppositions:  
1. I will only refer to acts that constitute weak complicity (variants 2-5). Whereas 
complicity in its strong sense (1) is an established topic in action theory and in the 
philosophy of law, it is exactly these weaker meanings of complicity that stand in need 
of philosophical elucidation.  
2. I will take it as understood that the purposes to which the act constituting complicity is 
carried out are not only morally neutral but morally good purposes and that the act in 
question has a reasonable chance to achieve these purposes. Unless one of these 
conditions is fulfilled there is no real moral conflict. (There might, however be a legal or 
even constitutional conflict, e. g. with the fundamental right of researchers to free 
inquiry.) If, for example, hESC research were carried out with highly problematic 
intentions (e. g. for reasons of biological warfare) or had absolute no chance to achieve 
any of its scientific or therapeutic aims, the (potential) complicity of this research would 
not constitute the problem it in fact is. The research would have to be viewed with 
scepticism even in the absence of complicity.  
On which factors does the intuition of a "moral stain" from complicity depend? Which 
variables are crucial for the perception that making use of bad practices of others for good 
ends is in some way morally tainted? I have already referred to the fact that it seems to be an 
inherent feature of the concept of complicity that complicity can only be attributed to an act 
C if the agent stands in some kind of co-operative relation to the original wrong W. It seems 
impossible, for example, to ascribe complicity to the various uses of pharmaceuticals that 
were developed in the past under circumstances that by modern standards would be 
morally unacceptable. Many standard medications were originally tested under conditions 
in which, for example, the requirement of informed consent in human subjects research was 
more or less unknown. It might be asked, however, whether this condition is also fulfilled in 
cases exemplifying the "weakest" variant of complicity in which the connection between W 
and C is mainly of a symbolic nature. I think, however, that even in these cases, some kind 
of co-operation between the agents involved is necessary for complicity even though this 
relation may be thin and indirect. In cases in which the relation is too thin to constitute even 
an indirect form of co-operation the concept of complicity seems to become inapplicable, for 
example, if a researcher makes use of the results of morally indefensible experiments 
published fifty years ago. The situation is different if he makes use of unpublished results of 
morally indefensible experiments as an employee of the same company that carried out the 
experiments. In this case there is a tighter relation of co-operation, mediated by the identity 
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of the company and the exclusive nature of the relevant information. This gives us one of 
the criteria on which the perceived moral significance of acts of complicity seems to depend, 
the perceived extent of co-operation involved in using the "fruits of a bad tree". The 
perception of complicity is considerably weakened if no co-operation at all is necessary to 
get the desired information or products, as in the case of the published scientific results of 
morally indefensible experiment, or if W lies in a psychically remote past so that the process 
of tradition is no more regarded as co-operative even in a thin way.  
Another factor, of at least the same importance, seems to be the relation between the extent 
to which W is morally unacceptable and the extent to which C is morally desirable. The 
intuition of complicity seems adequate only if there is an obvious disproportion between 
these factors. Complicity can be present only if there is a clear imbalance between the moral 
badness of W and the moral goodness of C, however good and bad are weighted in this 
kind of balancing. (Some ethicists, for example so-called prioritarian utilitarians think that 
the bad should systematically carry more weight than the good, in accordance with 
widespread popular moral perception.) Apart from this systematic point of dissent, even 
more dissent is to be expected about where to strike the balance between good and bad and 
whether, in individual cases, the good to be expected from C is at all able to compensate for 
the evil of W. A striking example of such dissent is presented in the contributions to Arthur 
Caplans book on the question whether the results of concentration camp experiments 
should be used in medical research. In this case, opinions were sharply divided between 
former victims (and their descendants) on the one hand, and researchers and doctors 
interested in having unrestricted access to these results (see, e. g. Kor 1992, 7 versus 
Freedman 1992, 147ff.). This question was already inconclusively discussed during the 
Nuremberg trials in 1946 (cf. Friele 2000, 127).  
If the bad done by W is balanced by the good done by C, or if the good done by C clearly 
outbalances the bad done by W, attributions of complicity are, as a rule, absent. For 
example, complicity is no issue in the context of importing organs explanted in countries 
with an opting-out regulation into countries in which this regulation is rejected. The 
reasoning is clear. Even those who seriously, and for moral reasons, object to the opting-out 
system do not feel that the moral blemish of this system is weighty enough to restrict the 
exchange of transplants, say  in the Eurotransplant network in which two countries with an 
opting-out regulation are co-operating partners. The moral stakes of transplantation are 
simply too weighty to fuss about the "deviant" system of organ procurement in 
neighbouring countries. An imbalance is, however seen to exist in the case of countries in 
which organs are commercialized or in which regulation and control of organ procurement 
are held to be inadequate. Even in these cases, however, the willingness to fight commercial 
organ procurement is limited in view of the situation of the organ buyer. The German 
Transplant Law, for example, contains an explicit mitigating clause that considerably lowers 
the probability that the buyer will be held to be punishable if he is identical with the patient 
needing the organ.  
Concerning this criterion, the situation in hESC research is controversial and fundamentally 
unclear. There is controversy both about the extent to which the practice of making use of 
early human embryos as providers of stem cells is morally problematic and about the extent 
to which the prospects of hESC are thought to be sufficiently favourable to justify a positive 
overall judgement on this line of research. At the extremes, opinions are diametrically 
opposed. Scientists and physicians, even if not directly or indirectly involved in hESC 
research, typically judge the moral opprobrium of embryo research to carry, if at all, less 
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weight than the moral prospects of ESC research. Representatives of the Christian churches, 
especially Roman Catholics, give more weight to the morally objectionable features of 
embryo research and are more sceptical of the prospects of hESC research. A further factor is 
that scientists tend to give significantly more moral weight to basic research than the 
Churches and their followers. This is an important factor since the justification of hESC 
research on the part of research organizations has recently considerably shifted to the 
scientific side. The more the potential therapeutic applications of hESC research recede into 
a far and uncertain future, the more this research is defended by its scientific rather than by 
its therapeutic merits. 
5. The status problem – once again 
The crucial factor in the differing assessments of hESC research continues to be the so-called 
status problem, the problem of the measure of protection owed to the human embryo. On 
the view that the embryo is due the same protection that is owed to newborns, say, 
extraction of stem cells from blastocysts is a serious crime, indeed murder. On the view that 
the embryo is due no or only minimal protection, the balance will, as a rule, go down on the 
side of research and no problem of complicity arises.  
There are two respects in which the status problem is involved in judgements of complicity 
in hESC research that should be clearly distinguished: protection of life and dignity. The 
derivation of hES cells from human embryos constitutes a violation of the principle of 
sanctity of life, understood in a sense that comprises all phases of human existence, in each 
of the specific forms it may assume, and exactly to the same degree. With dignity, 
understood as a comprehensive principle of non-instrumentalization, this is different. It is 
relevant to all methods mentioned above, but in different degrees. Extracting stem cells from 
PGD embryos is commonly seen as a more objectionable violation of the principle of human 
dignity than extraction of stem cells from supernumerary embryos from IVF because it 
involves selection, and the same holds for the retrieval of stem cells by research cloning 
because it constitutes  the production of a human being with the only purpose of destroying 
it and using its parts as a means to an end. Protection of life and dignity differ in other 
respects as well. Though both are components of the "status" of the embryo, taken together 
in the expression "status problem", they exhibit a very different logic and, to the extent that 
they are applied to prenatal human existence, are far from being correlatives. A "right to life" 
may be thought to admit of grades, whereas this seems impossible with dignity. An embryo 
either possesses dignity or not, whereas its right to life may be thought to be negotiable 
against other kinds of goods and other rights. And not all violations of a potential prenatal 
right to life are necessarily violations of dignity. Abortion is clearly a violation of a potential 
embryonic right to life, but it is a violation of dignity only if dignity is interpreted as 
implying a right to life, an interpretation that is by no means the only one possible. On the 
other hand, manipulations of the embryo for research purposes might be seen as violations 
of its dignity even if the embryo is not thereby destroyed or damaged. There are, then, good 
reasons to keep the issues of protection of life and the protection of dignity separate and 
discuss both issues each by each. 
Are there reasons for an embryonic right to life sufficiently strong to dominate the good that 
comes from hESC research?  I take it that the most plausible conception of prenatal 
protection of life is a gradualist conception according to which the "right to life" of the 
embryo/foetus is a matter of degrees, starting at a very low value and then gradually rising 
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until it reaches its peak at the time of birth. As this rising curve may be drawn in very 
different ways, this conception is really a bundle of conceptions and not strictly one. But this 
bundle is held together by the fundamental idea that the duties owed to the human embryo 
are not a constant but correlated with the developmental stages of the embryo, with the later 
stages requiring more protection than the earlier ones. It is true, this general conception has 
not so far been theoretically explicated in any systematic form. It is hard to deny, however, 
that it is implicit in most of the normative views about the status of prenatal human 
existence both in bioethics and in general morality. For example, the embryo is nearly 
always held to be less worthy of protection in the first few days of its existence than in later 
stages (see, e. g., Veerger et al. 1998, 11), a fact that is of some relevance in the discussion of 
the disparity in the legal handling of prenatal diagnosis with subsequent selective abortion 
on the one hand and of pre-implantation diagnosis with subsequent selective implantation 
on the other (cf. Birnbacher 2007). Furthermore, gradualist thinking is clearly mirrored in 
most criminal codes by the apportionment of punishments for taking the life of embryos and 
foetuses. In many legislations, termination of pregnancy within the first 14 days of gestation 
is not punishable, as well as the destruction or non-implantation of IVF embryos before the 
conjunction of sperm and egg cell though they have the same potential to become full-
fledged human beings under suitable conditions as embryos in the full sense. Finally, 
abortion is nearly everywhere punished to a significantly lesser degree than infanticide or 
manslaughter/murder.  
All this is plainly incompatible with a constant-protection view like that of the Roman 
Catholic Church that ascribes the same right to life to the embryo/foetus in all stages of 
development, either in the form of a right not be destroyed by interventions from outside or 
even in the sense of a right to be saved from death by natural causes. A constant-protection 
view is usually based on a potentiality principle in conjunction with an identity principle 
according to which any human embryo has a right to life that has the potentiality to develop 
into a fully developed human being and (in order to exclude pre-conjunction embryos) is 
numerically identical with this being. Such a strong principle does not seem at all plausible. 
The reason for this is that a potentiality argument in the case of humans would only be 
plausible if it were plausible in the general case, i. e. that it would be true that if x has the 
right to life, a potential x has a right to life not only for humans but for any organism 
whatsoever. It does not seem plausible, however, that such a general principle can be 
accepted. A bird's egg or the shoot of a tree are both potential birds or trees, but I do not 
think it acceptable that they have the same moral status as fully developed birds and trees. 
Normative properties of organisms like the possession of rights are supervenient properties. 
They supervene on certain descriptive properties of these organisms. As the human embryo 
shares only some of the properties of a born human being, it shares only some of its 
normative properties. In the same gradual way the embryo/foetus acquires the properties of 
the born child, so it gradually acquires its normative properties, among them a right to life 
that is only fully developed at a rather late stage of gestation, with viability or birth.  
Apart from that, the combination of a strong potentiality principle with the identity 
principle according to which a potential x shares the normative properties of the actual x 
seems to imply that even the pre-conjunction embryo should be ascribed a right to life 
simply because potentiality implies identity, with the consequence that the principle of 
identity cannot serve as a limiting principle, restricting the right to life to the fully 
developed embryo. If the embryo that will become x is identical with x, then the pre-
conjunction embryo that is to become this embryo is also identical with x. Even it is not 
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identical with the future child as a human being, it is identical with the future child under 
some broader concept, for example as an assemblage of organic matter. The consequence is 
that even the pre-conjunction embryo should have a right to life. This is not only highly 
implausible, it is also plainly incompatible with the legal practice in countries that prohibit 
the destruction or non-implantation of IVF embryos but permit the discarding of 
cryoconserved pre-conjunction embryos that have been fertilized but are not used for 
implantation.  
According to a gradualist view (or rather: the variant of gradualism I would like to suggest, 
there may be others), there is, then, no real problem of complicity in hESC research as far as 
a purported right to life of the embryo is concerned, provided that the conditions stated 
above are met: that some good is to be expected from this research and that the hopes 
accompanying this research cannot be discarded as illusory. The reason is that the extraction 
of stem cells which is often taken as the crucial ethical stumbling block of this research takes 
place in a very early stage of embryonic development, within a few days after fertilisation. 
According to a gradualist conception of embryo protection the protection of life due to the 
embryo at this stage is minimal. This is in agreement with the legal practice of most societies 
which do not sanction abortions (e. g. by abortive pills) in the first two weeks of gestation or, 
as in the German criminal law, posit a legal definition of abortion that excludes abortion 
within the first two weeks of development to count legally as abortion. 
This is not the end of the matter. Even if the complicity attributed to hESC research cannot 
plausibly be based on arguments pertaining to the life of the embryo from which the stem 
cells are taken, there is another dimension of the protection of the embryo to be considered, 
the dimension of dignity. It is an essential and uncontested component of the concept of 
dignity that dignity excludes what may be called total instrumentalization, i. e. dealing with 
a human being like a thing or a commercial good, like in slavery or in forced labour. Though 
dignity is a normative dimension clearly distinguishable from the protection of life, dignity 
is compromised most blatantly whenever instrumentalization (making someone a "mere" 
means to extraneous ends) takes the form of the deliberate taking the life of someone in 
order to achieve ends that have nothing to do with the ends of the person sacrificed. 
Sacrificing the life of a person for the ends of others seems a particularly clear case of a 
violation of the dignity of that person, and this is reflected in many military laws that 
prohibit sending soldiers on missions on which they are certain to lose their lives however 
clearly these missions would serve important strategic ends. On the same line, the German 
constitution which makes human dignity the highest and even non-negotiable constitutional 
value and imposes on the state a similarly non-negotiable obligation not only not to violate 
but also to actively protect the dignity of all human individuals is commonly interpreted as 
excluding any "sacrifice" of the life of one person for the life (or other fundamental goods) of 
others, with the exception of cases in which the life of an innocent victim can be saved only 
at the expense of the life of the perpetrator of the crime by which he has been made a victim. 
The question arises whether the destruction of human embryos for the sake of the retrieval 
of stem cells is not exactly an exemplification of this kind of "sacrifice" of one life for the 
lives of others, or, more realistically, for the scientific and remotely therapeutic purposes by 
which hESC is currently justified. Since the principle of human dignity is rapidly gaining 
ground at present and is increasingly introduced into constitutions and into international 
treaties and conventions the resistance to hESC is much more to be expected from this 
quarter than from that of the protection of embryonic life. An additional reason why 
resistance is to be expected on grounds of human dignity rather than on grounds of the 
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sanctity of life is the pragmatic one that restrictions on account of instrumentalization are 
feasible whereas restrictions on account of sanctity of life are not. It does not seem possible 
to abolish abortion whereas it is perfectly possible to close the door to new developments in 
biomedicine such as hESC research, PGD, and human cloning.  
6. Do human embryos possess dignity? The German debate on hESC 
research 
A characteristic feature of German bioethics and especially of German biopolitics is the 
outstanding role assigned to the principle of human dignity in biopolitical debate. One of 
the reasons for this is the distinctly Kantian character of the German constitution. The 
reference to Kantian principles was seen as a common denominator on which the politically 
strongly heterogeneous parties to the founding assembly of the Bundesrepublik in 1949 could 
find a consensus. Moreover, the principle of dignity which had just been introduced as a 
leading principle into the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man by the United Nations 
in 1948, was seen as a a safeguard against tyranny and particularly against the atrocities of 
the Nazi regime from which most members of the assembly had suffered in one way or 
other. Since then, the principle of respecting human dignity laid down in article 1 of the 
German constitution became a kind of creed that had an important supporting function for 
the cohesion and identity of German society. However, while the parties deciding on the 
wording of the constitution were strongly divided over the question whether human dignity 
(and the fundamental right to life) is to be understood in an inclusive sense, comprising 
prenatal human forms of existence alongside with the existence of born human individuals, 
the Constitutional Court and, subsequently, constitutional law increasingly made the 
inclusive interpretation the standard interpretation and held the principles of dignity and of 
protection of life to be applicable to prenatal forms of existence in roughly the same way as 
to born individuals. Though there is, at the moment, an unmistakable tendency in 
constitutional law to revise this interpretation and especially to re-interpret the principle of 
human dignity in such a way that it cannot further function (because of its non-
negotiability) as an effective check on embryo research and the introduction of reproductive 
technologies such as single-embryo transfer and PGD, a majority of politicians continue to 
think that the principle is incompatible with the use of human life as a means to an end in all 
possible forms, irrespective of the stage to which human life has developed.  
According to this view, the moral necessity to preserve and to protect human life starts with 
the conjunction of egg and sperm. However, all controversial practices in reproductive 
medicine at present discussed in law and politics involve, in one way or another, 
"instrumentalizing" early human life. Pre-implantation diagnosis and pre-implantation sex 
selection involve the selective discarding of unwanted blastocysts, retrieval of stem cells 
involves the destruction of blastocysts, research cloning even the production of human 
embryos with the explicit intention to destroy them at a later stage. These practices, 
therefore, cannot be justified as forms of well-intentioned paternalism. In all cases, human 
life in its early forms is made a means to ends other than the life or well-being of the embryo 
concerned, no matter how important and respectable these other ends may be. Furthermore, 
the introduction of any one of these new methods is seen as a potential door-opener to 
embryo research, which in itself is a realistic perspective, given that the physicians 
practising pre-implantation diagnosis in the context of a University clinic will hardly be 
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satisfied with practising it without making it at same time the object of research, not least to 
improve its success rate. 
The ethical premises underlying this stance are essentially two: 1. The concept of human 
dignity applies to prenatal human life in the same way as it applies to postnatal human life. 
2. The principle of the protection of human dignity applies to prenatal human life with the 
same force as it applies to postnatal human life, i. e. it is as little negotiable against other 
rights and obligations as it is in its application to human beings at a postnatal stage.  
Both premises have a relatively firm backing in law. The first premises was confirmed in the 
second judgement of the Constitutional Court on abortion in 1975. One of the famous quotes 
from this judgement is that "human dignity is a property of human life wherever it exists". 
Not human persons (in whatever sense of "person"), but human life is the proper object of 
protection in the name of human dignity. The second premise is a more or less undisputed 
principle of constitutional law. Differently from the other basic rights formulated in the 
Constitution, including the right to life, the right to protection of human dignity is absolute 
and non-negotiable. It has to be given a minimalistic interpretation in order to prevent that 
conflicts of basic rights become ubiquitous. These two premises taken together do not seem 
to leave much room for alternatives. The Embryo Protection Act with its strict verdict on 
"instrumentalizing" human embryos, for research or other non-reproductive purposes, 
seems a more or less logical conclusion from the constitutional situation. 
It is not surprising that the legal situation has been a major factor in the estrangement 
between biopolitics and bioethics in the field of beginning-of-life issues. Bioethical 
discussion has throughout been much more open than biopolitics and biolaw to arguments 
in favour of liberalisation. In bioethics, and especially in secular, non-theological bioethics, 
the nearly absolute ban on embryo research and on the consumption of embryos for non-
reproductive purposes has rarely been upheld with the same strictness as it has been upheld 
in politics and law. When, in 1990, the Embryo Protection Law was passed by the Bundes-
tag, it came as a surprise to most bioethicists, since bioethical discussion had already moved 
quite a long way from the moral extremism of the Roman Catholic Church. Even the so-
called Benda commission that had been investigating the ethical and legal issues of 
reproductive medicine prior to the Embryo Protection Act (and which did not consist of 
particularly "progressive" experts) had held embryo research to be permissible within limits. 
There are basically two groups of bioethicists in Germany who are not prepared to follow 
the Constitutional Court in its application of a strong principle of human dignity to human 
embryos regardless of their stage of development. A minority of bioethicists has raised 
doubts about the very possibility of applying the concept of human dignity to prenatal 
human life. According to this opinion, human dignity is primarily a political and social 
concept, a "Kampfbegriff", guiding the struggle against such practices as torture, slavery, 
capital punishment, and the persecution of racial, ethnic or religious minorities. Its historical 
roots are located essentially in the emancipation movements of the Enlightenment and in the 
workers' movement of the 19th century, with the double focus on personal autonomy and 
social security. Its main content is identified as liberty, non-discrimination, social rights, and 
such elements of self-respect as freedom from humiliation and persecution. This concept, in 
consequence, is simply not held to be relevant to practices such as embryo research and 
embryo selection which affect human life at a stage at which it is neither sentient nor 
capable of aims which might be frustrated by political or social pressure.  
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Another group of bioethicists thinks that the principle of human dignity is applicable to 
prenatal human life, and even to the early human embryo, but that in this context it has 
neither the same sense nor the same force as the concept that is applied to born human 
beings. According to this opinion, the Constitutional Court's mistake is to treat the concept 
of human dignity as univocal. There is not one, but a family of interrelated concepts, each 
one having its own domain and its own peculiar force. There is, first, the strong concept 
applying to born human beings, which indeed may be treated as non-negotiable for 
practical purposes. (Theoretically, it remains possible that one is forced to choose between 
two atrocities each of which violates human dignity.) It comprises a number of basic rights 
such as minimal liberty, minimal self-respect, and basic social services. This concept is 
central to modern democracies and an undisputed achievement of the secular emancipation 
process started by the Enlightenment. This strong concept, however, is not relevant to 
human embryos, at least not to the temporal stages which are affected by the practices 
under discussion.  
Apart from this strong concept of human dignity this group of bioethicists recognize two 
other, derivative concepts of human dignity: a secondary concept which applies to 
everything human in the biological sense, irrespective of its stage of development or decay, 
and a generic concept which applies to the human species as such and which is often 
invoked in non-consequentialist arguments against such practices as the production of man-
animal-hybrids and  reproductive cloning. Both concepts are considerably weaker in 
normative force and differ from the strong concept semantically and syntactically. While 
human dignity in its primary meaning needs an individual subject as bearer, this is not 
necessary with the two derivative concepts. With them, there need not be a real subject to 
correspond to the grammatical subject. This is evident where human dignity is applied to 
the species as such, but it is also the case in its application to human zygotes and early 
embryos, entities that cannot reasonably be assumed to be "real subjects". With human 
dignity in its primary sense the object of respect and protection is the concrete human being. 
With human dignity in its derivative senses it is something more abstract: humanity, human 
life, or the identity and dignity of the human species defined by its specific potentialities.  
According to this second position, which is  taken by the present author, human dignity is in 
fact applicable to the early embryo but in a different and specific sense in which it is does 
not carry the quasi-absolute moral force of the primary concept. Prenatal human life 
deserves respect, but not the absolute respect an adult person deserves. It deserves respect 
because it is a form of specifically human life, irrespective of whether it is viable or not, 
whether it is destined to be discarded anyway (as most "spare" embryos from in-vitro-
fertilisations are) or whether there is some chance that it will develop into a full-blown 
human being. What is important, however, is that this respect is a weak form of respect 
which is not incompatible, as the respect owed to born human beings is, with treating 
embryos as a means to an end, provided these ends are themselves sufficiently respectable. 
The basis of this respect is straightforward speciesism, or, to use a more sympathetic term, 
"generic solidarity". It is one of the forms by which a feeling of unity with everything human 
is expressed, no matter how this feeling of unity is philosophically construed, in a deep, 
metaphysical way, or in an everyday, naturalistic way. One of the implications of this 
concept is that it applies independently of whether the human being in question is among 
the living or the dead. Human corpses qualify as objects of this kind of weak respect no less 
than human embryos. In this way, the close link that has been established between the 
principle of human dignity and the principle of "sanctity of life" is weakened. Respect for 
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human dignity, in its secondary sense, is a principle different from that of respect for life, 
even if respect for life is one of the forms by which respect for human dignity can be 
expressed.  
7. Conclusion  
Does this mean that complicity is, after all, not really a problem in the controversy about 
hESC research? In fact, for those on the pro-side, complicity does not seem to be a real issue 
because they generally do not think that embryo research is sufficiently problematic to 
conflict with what they see as morally desirable in the development of new therapies and in 
basic research. For those on the anti-side, on the other hand, complicity does not seem to be 
an issue either, because they condemn the embryo manipulation preceding hESC research 
and are less optimistic on the side of therapeutic prospects and less enthusiastic on the side 
of the intrinsic moral value of scientific research. They do not need to confront the 
complicity problem because they are up against hESC research anyway.  
Complicity is a problem only for those who are torn between the conviction that embryo 
research is (for intrinsic or extrinsic reasons) a moral evil and the conviction that hESC 
research is worth pursuing either for its medical or for its scientific prospects or both. The 
class most likely to face this uncomfortable dilemma is the class of conservative politicians 
in countries such as Germany and Italy in which embryo research is strictly prohibited by 
law, but in which hESC research is nevertheless permitted or even encouraged, although 
only with raw material imported from countries with more permissive laws. For these 
politicians, complicity is, and should be, the stumbling block lying in the way of pragmatic 
compromise. 
This result is only one of the facets of the deep gulf that separates bioethics from biopolitics. 
This gulf depends on the fact that biopolitics follows, and has to follow, criteria which go far 
beyond the criteria of bioethical judgement. A solution to a bioethical problem may be 
ethically and rationally acceptable without being politically acceptable. There are at least 
two other criteria that have to be satisfied. First, biopolitical solutions must conform to 
certain procedural norms. They must have been arrived at on the basis of accepted 
democratic procedures. There is no guarantee that solutions arrived at in this way are in full 
conformity with the norms of intellectual rigour, coherence and adequacy to which 
bioethicists are professionally committed. Second, the solutions found by politics have to 
take into account pragmatic considerations such as conserving social harmony, which again 
may conflict with considerations of ethical adequacy. Biopolitics cannot contradict public 
opinion to the same extent that bioethics can. If it does, it risks losing the acceptance of 
substantial sections of the population. Since biopolitical problems often touch quite 
fundamental ethical and religious beliefs, these risks are substantial. As a rule, political 
decisions will have to be taken in a way that allows even those whose attitudes and interests 
have been deeply frustrated, to accept the decision, at least in principle. In a pluralistic 
society, this means that political decisions touching deep convictions will often assume the 
form of compromise solutions by which none of the parties concerned is fully satisfied but 
which nevertheless minimise the net sum of frustrations on all sides.  
As far as Germany is concerned, legislation with regard to beginning-of-life issues has 
throughout followed the policy of committing itself to rather strong principles in order to 
satisfy the adherents of "pro-life" positions, and to make room, at the same time, for a wide 
range of exceptions in order to satisfy the adherents of "pro-choice" positions. More 
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concretely, the strategy of satisfying both sides at the same time and by the very same law 
has consisted mainly in officially condemning a practice more strongly than it has been 
condemned before, and at the same time extending the availability of the practice so that all 
those who might benefit from it have free access to it. This is illustrated not only  by the 
German abortion law but also by the Stem Cell Law. The abortion law declares abortion 
during the first trimester to be illegal, thus satisfying the adherents of the "pro-life" position 
on abortion. At the same time it exempts it from penal sanctions, thus enabling pregnant 
women to have an abortion in the first trimester even for trivial reasons. A similar strategy is 
followed by the Stem Cell Law. On the one hand, it is stricter even than the Embryo 
Protection Act in regulating not only the retrieval of stem cells in Germany (which continues 
to be illegal) but also the use of imported stem cells legally retrieved in other countries. At 
the same time it does not only make room for research with embryonic stem cells in 
Germany, it also reduces the possibility that this kind of research might be restricted by 
ethics committees and internal review boards. The law's demand that a special ethics 
commission be installed to control stem cell research with imported stem cells partakes of 
the same dialectic characteristic of the law as such: On the one hand, it expresses the 
political will to have a particularly keen eye on whether stem cell research is conducted in 
an ethically defensible way. On the other hand, the functions of the commission are reduced 
to a purely symbolic one. The commission is given no discretion to reject a submitted 
research protocol that is scientifically sound. Its function is merely to examine whether the 
protocol is scientifically plausible and whether the stem cells have been imported by the 
ways specified by the law. There is no room for restricting research with stem cells for 
genuinely ethical reasons. Thus, the law is a good example of what has been called 
"symbolic politics". It shows the political will to promote stem cell research in Germany. At 
the same time, it expresses this will in a way that misleads pro-lifers into thinking that legal 
control in a sensitive and controversial field of research is tightened rather than loosened. 
The price to pay for this kind of political compromise is a considerable lack of transparency 
and consistency. This is a high price because transparency is a central democratic virtue. It 
prevents that a policy is understood and found to be intelligible by the general population. 
In biopolitics, compromises seem inevitable. At they same time, they inevitably seem to 
involve some form of moral opportunism.  
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range of diseases and conditions that currently lack therapies or cures. This book describes recent advances
in the generation of tissue specific cell types for regenerative applications, as well as the obstacles that need to
be overcome in order to recognize the potential of these cells.
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